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Abstract 
This paper offers a theory of conditionality lending 
in  19 -century  international  capital  markets.  We  argue 
that  ownership  of  reputation  signals  by  prestigious 
banks  rendered  them  able  and  willing  to  monitor 
government  borrowing.  Monitoring  was  a  source  of  rent, 
and it led bankers to support countries facing liquidity 
crises  in  a  manner  similar  to  modern  descriptions  of 
“ relationship ”  lending  to  corporate  clients  by 
“ parent ”  banks.  Prestigious  bankers’  ability  to 
implement  conditionality  loans  and  monitor  countries’ 
financial  policies  also  enabled  them  to  deal  with 
solvency.    We  find  that,  compared  with  prestigious 
bankers,  bondholders’  committees  had  neither  the  tools 
nor  the  prestige  required  for  effectively  dealing  with 
defaulters.  Hence  such  committees  were  far  less 
important than previous research has claimed. 
                                                       
 Graduate Institute, Geneva, and the University of Geneva (respectively). We are grateful to Vincent Bignon 
and Larry Neal for comments on earlier drafts and for helping us focus the argument. We thank Peter Lindert for 
fruitful exchanges over recovery rates. They should be absolved of our shortcomings. The help and support of 
archivists (in particular, the ING Barings Archive and the Rothschilds Archive in London) is gratefully 
acknowledged. 3 
“ Enter the Ghost. ... Exit the Ghost. ”  
(stage directions in Shakespeare’s Hamlet) 
 
This  paper  develops  an  analysis  of  conditionality  lending  during  the  long  era  of  London-based 
―globalized‖ foreign government debt markets that ended at the start of World War I. The argument 
we make is that the concepts and insights from modern relationship banking theory provide powerful 
tools for understanding how international capital markets could exact ―structural adjustment‖ from 
borrowing governments. In a nutshell, this occurred because of market structure. A few prestigious 
intermediaries  owned  the  ability  to  ―certify‖  a  borrowing  government,  which  enabled  them  to 
influence the terms of market access. The intermediaries thus had a measure of monopoly power over 
borrowers and used it to obtain adjustments that increased the likelihood of repayment. Conditionality 
lending was an investment in the prestigious bankers’ own brand. This explains why prestigious banks 
were both able and willing to manage their clients’ liquidity crises. 
The starting point of this new view is earlier research by Flandreau and Flores (2009) providing 
analytical insights on, and empirical evidence of, the role of capital, prestige, and market share as 
collaterals in the foreign government bond markets that developed in London in the early 1820s. Here 
we seek to expand the range of the argument both analytically and historically. First, we argue that 
―rules of the game‖ similar to those that operated in the early 1820s were also in force in subsequent 
periods and, in fact, apply to the entire Pax Britannica era (1815–1913). Second, we show how the 
signaling role (emphasized in our previous research) was combined with control. Third, we show how 
focus on control does provide a theoretical clarification of the logic of conditionality lending to 19
th-
century foreign governments. 
An important aspect of our theory (if not the main one) is that it departs from conventional thinking 
in recent historical research on sovereign debt. The dominant mode of thinking has been to emphasize 
three  alternative  modes  of  governing  sovereign  debt:  bondholder  activism,  high-quality  domestic 
institutions, and imperial influence. In this paper, we abstract from the role of imperial influence, 
whose  invocation  amounts  to  assuming  the  problem  away.  External  imperial  control  means  that 
sovereign debt is not sovereign at all, explaining why the debts of colonies have been generally and 
rightly  perceived  as  less  risky  by  investors.
1  We also abstract from do mestic institutions and the 
North–Weingast veto-point theme, since this is simply another approach to assuming the problem 
away. There are many real-world examples of when ―desirable‖ institutions were not present and yet 
lending occurred. When, say, Argentina or (as Nathaniel de Rothschild put it) ―the Khan of Khiva, or 
… any of those States‖ were borrowing, they were likely to default and did.
2 In such cases, markets 
had to deal with the resulting mess.  We therefore investigate the situation of countries  for which 
neither imperial control nor appropriate domestic institutions (whatever may be meant by that) were 
available.  
                                                       
1 See Accominotti, Flandreau, and Rezzik (2010) for a study and survey of default risk in British colonies. 
2 Select Committee (1875, p. 268). 4 
Previous  research  has  suggested  that  the  ―solution‖  to  these  problems  would  have  been  the 
emergence of bondholders’ committees (such as the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders of 
1868) to coordinate creditors’ activism and perhaps increase the odds of sovereign repayment.
3 To the 
casual observer it seems that bondholders’ committees were the only available mechanism to deal with 
default, so their operation attracted considerable research interest; a few equations later down the road, 
authors grew accustomed to seeing these committees as the engine of successful sovereign debt in the 
19
th century. However, focusing on bondholders while ignoring the rest of the cast is analogous to 
putting on Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. In the global financial game, the lead is played by 
the international banker. Bondholders set the drama into action by seeking revenge (thus playing the 
Ghost’s role in Hamlet), but the instrument of revenge (the Prince) was the banker. 
The language of corporate finance theory provides a natural way to think of bankers and how their 
actions differed from those of bondholders’ committees: to distinguish creditors’ committees from 
international bankers, one may liken their respective roles to ―direct‖ monitoring by shareholders and 
―delegated‖ monitoring by a parent bank. These alternative institutions perform in different ways, 
address different informational problems, and are therefore optimal in different settings. It is often 
emphasized that bank monitoring becomes optimal when control through shareholder assemblies fails. 
Shareholder assemblies can fail when they prove unable to acquire relevant information from the agent 
(borrower) or because coercion is impossible owing to such collective action problems as inability to 
coordinate and free-riding. In such instances (and if some additional conditions are met), delegated 
monitoring through a bank may be the superior arrangement.
4 
In order for underwriting banks to  play a role in our tale, there must have been some  aspects to 
their organization that ensured  value would be created by  their intervention.  On this account, our 
previous joint research establishes that, in the early 19
th century, certain underwriters could add value 
because of their reputation or prestige. Prestige enabled bankers to own a large market share and 
would have been lost had they cheated investors. This finding addresses the contracting ―externality‖ 
that prior research had argued is a key weakness of international debt and bondholders’ collective 
action. Thus, monitoring by reputable banks rested on imperfect competition. In other words, even 
before the bondholders could organize themselves as a cartel, a mechanism for concentrating lending 
                                                       
3 Bondholders’ committees must also be distinguished from imperial influence. The committees lobbied British 
policy makers to use  their gunboats and  diplomatic facilities, but the policy makers feared moral hazard and 
diplomatic complications. The reason, as emphasized by Platt (1968), was that military intervention was usually 
not feasible because it risked triggering hostile reactions from rival powers. As The Economist (14 November 
1868, p. 1301) stated when the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders was founded: ―we should be damaged by 
the result of the meeting held to-day if it went forth that the meeting have endorsed the view that it is the duty of 
the English government to compel foreign Governments to pay the debts incurred to English subjects. If the 
Government were to go to war for such a purpose with Venezuela, they would involve themselves in this 
position—that if larger powers should act in the same way, they should also go to war with them. I think it is 
dangerous to have the idea go forth that when an Englishman lends his money to a foreign Government he is 
creating a national obligation, guaranteed by the full weight of the English government.‖ 
4 Diamond (1984), Fama (1985). Tirole (2002) adapts these concepts to the modern period’s international 
financial system. 5 
authority existed ―naturally‖ in the underwriting market. We shall argue  that there are reasons to 
believe this natural monopoly or oligopoly probably outweighed what bondholders could do, given the 
latter’s tendency to free-ride. Moreover, although bondholders’ committees may have carried sticks 
(they  could,  in  principle,  prevent  countries  from  borrowing  in  the  market  to  which  they  were 
affiliated), they had no carrots; because they were not in the lending business, they could not, for 
instance, rescue a borrower facing an illiquidity crisis. 
In contrast, prestigious underwriters did have such power. While entirely neglected in the recent 
macroeconomic literature, this theme has been popular with some previous business historians who 
previously suggested that prestige did play a role in foreign debt underwriting (See, for example, Hidy 
(1949) on Barings, Gille (1965, 1967) on Rothschilds, and Suzuki (1994) on Japanese government 
finance).  In  this  paper,  we  seek  to  systematize  these  earlier  intuitions  by  providing  a  rigorous 
framework to handle them. In particular, rather than focusing on specific banking houses or borrowers, 
we characterize the general landscape in which borrowers and banking houses interacted. Moreover, 
we articulate a theory to explain why prestige played a role in crisis lending. We argue that prestige 
and market power earned some bankers an informational rent on country-specific knowledge and put 
them in a convenient position to deal with payment crises. They could decide whether a given country 
was experiencing a liquidity or solvency crisis and then address it. We suggest prestige gave rise to a 
type of bargaining between lenders and borrowing governments that is similar to that described in 
―relationship  banking‖  models.  These  models  study  the  reasons  for  the  emergence  of  repeated 
interactions between banks and corporate borrowers (as in today’s Japanese system of main banks or 
in the German system of universal banks). The traditional argument for relationship banking is that 
banks have comparative advantages in corporate monitoring. An important theoretical insight is the 
role of liquidity provision. The main bank is expected to provide support to its clients in difficult times 
because of (among other things) greater signalling power. A corollary is that the bank acts not only 
through signaling but also through control. The main bank can deliver value by enforcing proper 
policies  and  creating  incentives  for  organizational  reform  when  needed.  Of  course,  the  resulting 
policies need not be conducive to growth or development; they need only protect the underwriter’s 
reputation for successful monitoring. This may explain why some earlier historians have  used the 
language of imperialism to describe the relation between banking houses and borrowers. 
It is unclear why the international banker has been omitted from the picture in recent years. One 
reason  may  involve  a  theoretical  prejudice—namely,  the  popularity  of  the  free-riding  argument. 
Researchers  have  generally  doubted  that  underwriting  banks  would  ever  be  able to  manage  their 
conflicts  of  interest.  An  explicit  statement  to  that  effect  is  given  by  Eichengreen  and  Portes: 
―bondholders recognized … that the issuing house was likely to be torn apart between the interests of 
two  sets  of  customers:  bondholders  and  foreign  borrowers.  ...  Given  the  potential  for  conflict  of 
interest,  most  readjustments  were  therefore  negotiated  not  by  issuing  houses  but  by  independent 
committees‖ (1986, p. 621). These remarks ostensibly apply to the interwar order, but they have 19
th-6 
century roots. For instance, The Economist wrote in 1897 about the powerful influence of issuing 
houses ―who find it practically impossible to do fresh business with the debtors while the default lasts, 
and who are therefore, naturally anxious that some sort of settlement should be arrived at, more 
especially as settlements of the kind … are frequently followed by new loans.‖
5 
Another explanation for the general neglect of the underwriting banks’ role may be the historical 
context in which the recent literature originated. Research on the history of international debt was 
sparked by the 1980s international debt crisis. At that time, it was clear that large U.S. banks had 
failed to monitor the risks of their own portfolio of commercial loans. This fact cast doubt on the 
capacity of intermediaries to screen (let alone to signal). Finally, it must be said that much of the 
action relevant to our argument occurred in places that cannot be easily observed (given the ―radar‖ 
targets of recent economic historians). Indeed, by providing support to illiquid governments, bankers 
helped  prevent  problems  from  reaching  the  market.  Cases  that  became  known  tended  to  be,  by 
construction, the most desperate ones: those in which bankers were less interested and for which the 
last-resort effort was left to bondholders. We do not say that these were unexciting or irrelevant cases, 
nor that the recent interest in bondholders’ committees (and in how they acted) is entirely misplaced. 
But we do argue that a good deal of filtering occurred upstream, so that a focus on bondholders suffers 
from selection bias. We therefore doubt that such a focus is an adequate starting point for studying the 
global financial architecture of the period 1815–1913. 
In this paper, we will study why and how prestigious underwriters (here, Rothschilds and Barings) 
found themselves helping out investors. We will argue that they did it in different ways an that there 
was product differentiation within prestige. Rothschilds specialized in the safest financial instruments 
and did a lot of monitoring and crisis lending in order to avoid default. Barings, on the other hand, 
engaged  in  riskier  deals  (witness  the  Barings  crisis!).  They  were  involved,  post-default,  in  debt 
restructuring and/or credit restoration operations. In other words, they acted as a collection agency for 
other bankers’ deals: coming to the rescue of borrowers’ honor (after borrowing countries had failed), 
which they sought to restore in order to shine their own shield. 
In summary, this perspective implies a nearly complete reversal of recent research trends. It has 
been argued elsewhere that bondholders created value by creating missing institutions of collective 
action to control market access (in essence, taking a stake in the underwriting process); however, we 
shall argue that prestigious underwriters created value by  handling the enforcement of delinquent 
debts and relying on a market power that was already there (in essence, exercising the kind of market 
access control that has been traditionally associated with bondholders). 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section I starts with recent work on bondholders’ 
committees and moves on to show that such discussion, interesting as it is, neglects one critical fact: 
that the uncertainty of securities performance (the spread between expected and actual performance) 
                                                       
5 The Economist (20 November 1897, p. 1624). 7 
was  influenced  by  the  identity  of  the  underwriter  who  originated  the  deal.  Section  II  articulates 
predictions from relationship banking theory and finds empirical support for them: borrowers that 
seldom switched underwriters were perceived as less risky. We also show that the market share of 
prestigious banks increased during downturns. Section III takes a closer look at the role of relationship 
banking in dealing with payment crises. We argue that the help provided to the borrowing country was 
customized to maximize underwriter’s prestige. A case study (involving Brazil and the House of 
Rothschilds) enables us to show that ―international lending of last resort‖ took place at penalty rates, 
indicating that prestigious banks were not philanthropists. Section IV analyzes the historical record of 
the House of Barings. We explain how and why prestige was used to deal with defaulting countries 
whose loans had been originated by other (ordinary) banks: prestige, in its Barings variant, ensured the 
credibility of the underwriter’s role as a collection agency. Section V completes the story: it provides a 
formal test of the comparative strength of bankers and bondholders’ associations by comparing the 
market’s  judgment  on  their  respective  involvement.  The  results  show  that  bondholders  lacked 
credibility. Section VI concludes. 
 
I. Underwriters’ Prestige and Bondholders’ Value: Evidence from the Mid-19
th Century 
A. Bondholders and trouble 
Since  the  Latin  American  debt  crisis  in  the  early  1980s,  management  of  international  default  is 
conventionally acknowledged as a critical facet of the operation of the international financial system. 
Absent  international  forms  of  enforcement,  improvement  in  the  outcomes  of  bargaining  may  be 
possible through reliance on market institutions, such as bondholders’ committees or collective action 
clauses (CACs) that limit obstruction by minority bondholders and foster creditor cooperation.
6 In 
addressing this possibility, analysts needed to understand how earlier regimes characterized by global 
financial integration managed this unpleasant feature of international lending. The result was increased 
and widespread interest in the London-based bondholders’ committee created in 1868 and known as 
the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (CFB), which was widely discussed in global think tanks and 
international financial institutions. 
Building on early work of Ronald (1935), Borchard (1951), and Wynne (1951) and on material 
contained in CFB Annual Reports, the recent literature was initiated by the papers of Eichengreen and 
Portes (1986, 1989). These authors argue that the superior organization of the British CFB compared 
with its U.S. counterpart (the American Foreign Bondholders Protective Council) explains the superior 
recovery rates of British bondholders. More recently, Wright (2004) provides theoretical arguments 
suggesting  that  the  CFB  served  to  enforce  collective  behavior  among  creditors  by  ―naming  and 
                                                       
6 On default and the political economy of bargaining, see Aggarwal (1989, 1996). On bondholder committees, 
see Eichengreen and Portes (1986, 1989) as well as the other cited works in this section. On CACs, see 
Eichengreen, Kletzer, and Mody (2003). 8 
shaming‖ members who defected from credit embargoes and lent to defaulters.
7 Mauro, Sussman, and 
Yafeh (2006, pp. 128–129, 162) argue that the CFB sought to protect the interest of its members by 
providing them with information about the borrowing countries and by fostering coordination among 
creditors. Esteves (2007) studies the performance of CFB-sponsored settlements
 and draws favorable 
conclusions. 
B. The trouble with bondholders 
All this is fair enough; indeed, it is what the Corporation’s reports tried to persuade people it was 
actually  doing.  However,  it  is  unanimously  acknowledged  by  the  writers  already  cited  that  the 
empirical  basis  for  making  such  inferences  is  fragile.  The  reason  (as  we  discuss  later)  is  that 
counterfactual  measures  of  the  effect  of  bondholders’  committees  are  not  easy  to  construct.  In 
addition, theoretical insight suggests that the case for bondholders monitoring is not airtight. If there is 
nothing else for bondholders to rely upon (as is much the case today), then they’d better be organized. 
At the very least, few would dispute that a bit of cooperation on the creditors’ end can do no harm. 
The point is that the 19
th-century world was not the vacuum suggested by modern discussions; rather, 
it was a world peopled with intermediaries (the underwriters) who took to heart the responsibility of 
enforcing some measure of gate-keeping (Flandreau et al. 2010). 
As a result, much happened before any matter was put in the hands of bondholders. Just as today’s 
IMF usually makes a last-ditch effort to shore up a failing country, intermediaries in the past were 
involved at the early stages of any crisis. In fact, intermediaries were often involved even before the 
crisis occurred—that is, when the security was structured and sold. And they did not walk away as the 
security aged. Lending certainly did not occur in an environment dominated by conflicts of interest, as 
usually portrayed by advocates of the importance of bondholders’ committees (Flandreau and Flores 
2009).  Instead,  foreign  lending  occurred  in  the  well-organized,  hierarchical  international  bond 
markets, where huge piles of capital served to collateralize government debt. Those who owned the 
capital had a special role to play because this capital was the security on which foreign debt markets 
were based. 
To see intuitively how the system worked, consider  a world in which there are two types of 
investors  (informed  and  uninformed)  and  two  types  of  governments  (good  and  bad).  Ordinary 
investors cannot tell a borrowing government’s type but informed intermediaries, the underwriting 
banks, can. However, intermediaries have incentives to cheat investors because their fees are thereby 
increased; yet investors understand that. In this context, sovereign debt may emerge as bankers are 
sorted  into  a  ―pyramid‖:  prestigious  bankers  have  monopoly  power  and  specialize  in  high-grade 
securities, while ordinary underwriters are competitive and deal with low-grade bonds. Flandreau and 
Flores (2009) show that Rothschilds was the leader during the 1820s; it surpassed all other banking 
houses  in  terms  of  market  share,  capital  stock,  and  performance  of  issues.  Prestige  was  used  as 
                                                       
7 Wright (2004) also claims that the CFB’s creation can be traced to recent violation of a creditors’ embargo and 
argues that the CFB was effective in deterring further violations. 9 
collateral  for  successful  origination  and  distribution  of  high-quality  government  securities.  That 
prestigious Rothschilds securities outperformed the rest underscores the role of prestige in supporting 
the rise of early 19
th-century government bond markets. Monopoly power by prestigious houses was 
the endogenous solution to a market problem, and it provided incentives for truthful revelation: a large 
market share ensured that misrepresentation was a suboptimal policy. For these banking houses, their 
foundation of sovereign debt was a barrier to entry that kept lesser houses—and conflicts of interest—
at bay.
8 
Now, a straightforward corollary from the pre ceding analytics is that ex ante monitoring should 
have had a counterpart in ex post efforts to make ends meet.  A banker who is concerned about the 
performance of securities he has originated should not walk away from the deals when headwinds are 
faced. Some evidence of this resilience is reported in Flandreau and Flores (2009), where we find that 
the volatility  of non-Rothschilds bond prices was not transmitted to Rothschilds bond prices ; this 
indicates (and anecdotal evidence also suggests) that Rothschilds intervened to support  its securities 
and that markets expected such interventions. Fighting contagion is one aspect of crisis management 
At a broader level, we ought to see prestigious banks making sure that value is delivered and acting as 
delegated troubleshooters in charge of dealing with crises and restructuring ailing countries. 
C. Trouble Free: Evidence 
This  ―holy  triangle‖  of  sovereign  debt  management  (the  happy  combination  of  countries’ 
performance, bondholders’ value, and underwriter’s prestige) is implied by early business historians’ 
accounts of leading firms. Hidy (1949, p. 477) claims that the House of Barings felt ―it assumed 
responsibility to both buyer and seller when it publicly marketed the securities of any government or 
corporation. That responsibility involved not only the protection of the borrower’s credit but also the 
investment of the client and the reputation of the marketer [i.e., Barings].‖ Reflecting on this, Hall 
(1963, p. 71) adds: ―it is not unlikely that a similar pattern of operating was evolved by the other 
leading houses.‖ Gille’s (1965) account of the operations of the House of Rothschilds during the 19
th 
century  reads  like  a catalog  of  quotes  suggesting  that prestigious  underwriters  displayed constant 
concern over clients and customers alike. The reputation of the intermediary rested on successful 
cooperation. 
To  what  extent  did  prestigious  banks  deliver  reliable  outcomes  throughout  the  19
th  century? 
Business  historians  have  assumed  they  did,  but  none  have  actually  checked.  In  addressing  the 
question, this paper combines information on expected and realized returns.  For a given bank,  if 
realized returns tend to equal expected ones (i.e., if ex post performance resembles the promises made 
                                                       
8 Previous research suggests Flandreau and Flores (2009) interpretation of the 1820s applies throughout the 19th 
century—a natural outcome given that market share supported credibility, which in turn protected market share 
and so generated persistence. Rothschilds retained its leadership in London sovereign issues until World War I, 
with Barings (the other prestigious house) never too far behind. Moreover, Rothschilds (the most prestigious 
firms with the greatest market share) had the lowest loan casualty rates during the major debt crises of the 1870s 
and 1890s (Flandreau et al. 2010). Flandreau and Flores (2010) find that switching from a prestigious to a non-
prestigious underwriter entailed a 300-basis-point increase in bond spreads. 10 
ex ante) then the underwriter is reliable. We may thus construct a scatter plot of realized returns as a 
function of ex ante yields. Expected returns are computed using information on issue prices and loan 
characteristics (and are estimated as the yield to maturity, YTM). Realized returns are measured by 
computing the actual performance of a security over its lifetime, which entails collecting material on 
the security’s history (realized rates of returns are painstakingly estimated as the internal rates of 
return, IRR). We have gathered the required evidence to document the performance of individual 
bonds whose sales were recorded during the mid-19
th-century boom–bust cycle that finally collapsed 
in the 1870s (Jenks 1927; Landes 1958; Suzuki 1994). We look at the universe of bond issues during 
the period 1850–1873 and, for each bond, trace its payment record up to 1878.
9 
Previous studies (e.g., Lindert and Morton 1989) have examined the debt record and have famously 
suggested that ex post returns were not so bad in the past  and that this  implied that some form of 
market discipline or relevant pricing was at work. However, this paper is the first to perform  an 
empirical test of the matter by conditioning returns on underwriters’ identity. This approach (which 
represents an important departure from traditional portfolio choice theory emphasis on risk and returns 
of individual securities) highlights the crucial role of signaling by intermediaries.
10 
The outcome of our test  is shown in  Figure 1. We represent expected returns on the  x-axis and 
realized  returns  on  the  y-axis.  The  diagonal  line,  which  we  call  the  reliability  line,  plots  where 
expected  and  realized  returns  equal  each  other.  Because  the  horizon  we  consider  is  not  exactly 
comparable across securities (we use a fixed horizon even though securities were issued at varied 
dates) and because of some minute computational issues, discrepancies from the 45° line may be 
observed even for well-performing securities—but the point is that  these discrepancies are small. 
Observations  below  the  confidence  line  mean  that  expectations  were  not  met:  this  is  the 
―disappointment area‖. To make the chart legible, we have limited losses to a compounded annual 
11% (the actual numbers, which can be much lower, are available from the authors). Note that the 
Rothschilds  deals  are  marked  with  squares  and  the  Barings  deals  with  lozenges;  triangles  mark 
outcomes  for  the  House  of  Bischoffsheim-Goldschmidt.  This  latter  firm  was  chosen  because, 
according to a subsequent parliamentary panel, it was the villain in this boom–bust cycle.
11 All other 
bankers’ deals are marked with dots. 
 
[[ INSERT Figure 1 about Here]] 
 
                                                       
9 The choice of a time horizon is arbitrary. An alternative is to compute the return over the entire life span of the 
securities. However, this is also arbitrary because the procedure would benefit bonds that were repaid before a 
major international shock. One advantage of picking the 1877 horizon is that it is subsequent to the series of 
defaults in the 1870s. A longer horizon was chosen for Russia because the country was then at war. Despite 
experimenting with different dates, we find that our basic conclusions do not change. 
10 Spence (1973) is the seminal paper on the importance of signals in economics. 
11 See Select Committee (1875), Jenks (1927), and Suzuki (1994). 11 
The figure strongly suggests that, for prestigious houses, expected and realized returns closely 
matched one another. The most impeccable record was that of the House of Rothschilds.
12 Barings’s 
record was quite clean, but they had one loan to Venezuela that turned sour. We see by contrast the 
disastrous record of Bischoffsheim-Goldschmidt. Moving to numbers, the correlation between ex ante 
and ex post returns was highest for Rothschilds (above 0.7). For the rest it was negative (about −0.5). 
In other words, the prestige of a ―name brand‖ was a source of reduction in uncertainty—a valuable 
service  for  risk-averse,  information-poor  investors.  Reflecting  this  was  an  exchange  between  Sir 
Henry James (MP) and Nathaniel de Rothschild during the hearings of the Select Committee that 
convened in 1875 to examine the foreign bond debacle of the 1870s. Sir Henry asked, half in jest: 
―But you have had experience, however, only with good loans?‖ Nathaniel replied: ―Only in good 
loans, I am happy to say.‖
13 The head of the House of Bischoffsheim-Goldschmidt, understandably, 
did not dare to show up during the same interviews. He prudently sent instead a physician’s certificate. 
The conclusion is that certain bonds did not need the intervention of bondholders in order to deliver 
value. The other ones were understood by the public to be dangerous because household brands were 
not attached to them. While they still may have been priced in an over-optimistic way (the 8% to 12% 
yields at issue of Bischoffsheim-Goldschmidt securities failed to compensate investors for subsequent 
losses) their high yields imply they were definitely not perceived to be investments for widows and 
little children. And since Rothschilds and Barings had a leading market share, the conclusion must be 
that a large part of the management and trouble shooting of the international financial system of the 
time was taken care of by prestigious banks and not by bondholders’ committees. Therefore, popular 
arguments about intermediaries’ free riding behavior deserve a harder look. 
 
II. Relationship Banking: Theory and Evidence 
The next item on the agenda is to determine whether prestigious bankers’ unusual results were 
achieved through making the right choices or through proper monitoring. Flandreau and Flores (2009) 
emphasize Rothschilds’s ability to cherry-pick. Yet even the world’s best cherry-picking cannot rule 
out accidents.  What did  prestigious  bank  do  when  inopportune  events  knocked  on the  door? We 
address this question in this section. For this purpose, we rely on insights from an expanding body of 
theoretical  literature  that  studies  the  condition  under  which  ―relationship  banking‖  emerges  and 
replaces (or complements) the action of creditors. The main insight of this theory is that banks can 
serve well as delegated monitors for shareholders and creditors and, in effect, deliver value. Among 
variants of this intuition, economists emphasize three factors: (1) main banks have advantages in 
gathering information about clients through economies of scale (the cost of information gathering 
declines  with  repeated  transactions);  (2)  there  are  economies  of  scope  in  that  banks  utilize  the 
                                                       
12 This is consistent with evidence in Flandreau and Flores (2009) for the 1820s and Flandreau et al. (2010) for 
other periods. 
13 Select Committee (1875, p. 270). 12 
information obtained through provision of other services; and (3) repeated transactions across services 
may  enable  banks  to  address  problems  arising  from  information  asymmetries  and  incomplete 
contracting. 
The  relevance  of  these  arguments  for  the  19
th-century  international  organization  is  obvious. 
Theoreticians have often stressed the importance of incomplete contracting in sovereign debt.
14 In 
19
th-century bond markets, relationship banking emerged to address asymmetries of information and 
the attendant limitations in contracting. But repeated interaction also meant that prestigious banks 
ended up knowing more about ―their‖ countries. Another aspect of this mechanism was the existence 
of economies of scope, since experience with some countries enhanced the monitor’s ability to make 
comparisons and inferences across customers. Still another positive externality arose from prestigious 
banks’ incentives to punish one country in order to protect their present and future ability to certify 
other countries.
15 Finally, the relationship banking theory suggests that the main bank does not act 
solely through signaling but also through control. The main bank has a capacity to deliver value by 
enforcing proper policies and creating incentives for organ izational reform when needed.
16  In the 
language of public finance , the equivalent of firm reorganization is fiscal restructuring. Thus our 
metaphor  implies  that,  during  the  19
th  century,  the  main  banks  had  decisive  influence  on 
macroeconomic policies. Of course, this is fully consistent with earlier popular and more academic 
historical accounts of the House of Rothschilds, each of which provides abundant anecdotal evidence 
of the advisory role this prestigious bank played for governments (Reeves 1887; Gille 1965, 1967; 
Bouvier 1992). 
 
A. Spreads and Turnover 
One way to get straight at the heart of the relationship banking analogy is to explore the link between 
borrowing countries’ spreads and their turnover with underwriters. We can think of it as a relation 
between the strength of the banker–country bond and the country’s market-perceived risk. We expect 
that countries that switched bankers less often were perceived as less risky. This prediction arises 
because countries that switched rarely remained attached to good bankers (a country being faithful to a 
bad banker is by definition unlikely to occur, which the data confirm) and because good bankers (to 
maintain their reputation as good) helped these countries bridge over financial trouble to the extent 
                                                       
14 See Bulow and Rogoff (1989) for a classic statement that emphasizes how lenders’ competition leads to the 
breakdown of sovereign debt. 
15 This shows that the conventional perspective on the House of Rothschilds—according to which its ascendancy 
proceeded from superior informational capacities (the apocryphal pigeons story)—may actually be reversed: 
information arose because Rothschilds was able to certify, not the other way around. Proponents of the view that 
information was exogenous to Rothschilds’s prestige include Gille (1965, 1967) and, more recently, Liedtke 
(2008). 
16 Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein (1990), Sharpe (1990), Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Petersen and Rajan 
(1994), Boot (2000), Boot and Thakor (2000), Lehmann and Neuberger (2001). Rajan (1992) addresses the 
capture problem. See Flandreau (2003a) for a discussion of relationship banking in 19
th-century international 
financial architecture. 13 
that countries were illiquid rather than insolvent. Such countries were therefore perceived by investors 
as being less risky. As a first approximation, then, we expect a positive relation between turnover (a 
measure of stability in banking relations) and average yield spreads at issue (a measure of sovereign 
risk as it is priced on the date of issue).
17 
The data used for this exercise covers 1877–1913. There are two reasons for this choice. First, this 
fairly extended time period provides enough market access events for individual countries to enable us 
to compute meaningful estimates. Second, examining a period later than the mid-19
th century (used in 
Section  I)  is  useful  for  confirming  that  our  model  has  broad  validity  throughout  the  entire  19
th 
century.
18 We define turnover as the probability that two subsequent loans to the same country are 
issued by different underwriters; we compute it as the sum of underwriter switches divided by the 
number of issues. In percentages, the value ranges between 0% (no change) and 100% (systematic 
change).
19 We excluded from the data set all countries for which fewer than three loans were made, as 
in such cases the volatility in the estimation of turnover is spurious. Figure 2 shows a significant and 
large positive relation. Countries faithful to their banker had lower interest rates, ceteris paribus. Other 
countries were like hot potatoes that ordinary bankers passed to one another—and to the public, who 
understood  the  risks  involved.
20  The empirical evidence fits the notion that pri vileged banking 
relations were closely associated with expected cooperation with bondholders.
21 
 
[[ INSERT Figure 2 about Here]] 
 
B. Role of Prestige in Debt Cycles 
Another way to consider the effects of relationship banking is by looking at boom–bust cycles. As 
already stated, relationship banking is expected to provide resources to deal with payment crises. An 
implication of our view is that prestigious banks’ support becomes particularly valuable during crises. 
In times of euphoria, the relative value of aristocratic financiers’ signal weakened owing to reduced 
risk aversion, but their seal of approval became critical during busts. When a crisis hit, investors 
suddenly became leery of risking further capital in the foreign debt market; at the same time, 
liquidations created havoc in governments’ ability to borrow (those who were caught short of funds 
faced serious problems). We therefore make the following prediction: the market share of prestigious 
                                                       
17 Cairncross (1953) makes a similar claim in explaining why Argentina’s yields were higher than Brazil’s. Note 
that a finer implication of our analysis is that countries with a better track record are more able to switch 
underwriters. In other words, a greater ability to self-certify (as obtains in stable environments) should increase 
turnover. We neglect this property in this study. 
18 Sources for this data set are described in Flandreau et al. (2010). 
19 When there are multiple underwriters, if any of the underwriters from the past issue is among the underwriters 
for the current issue then we do not count this as a switch. 
20 For a paper making related claims in a different context, see Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001). 
21 This finding may go some way toward explaining the puzzle in Tomz and Wright (2007), who find that the 
historical link between defaults and ―bad times‖ is weaker than what most modern theories predict. The reason is 
that default has more to do with the banking relationship than with the economic environment. 14 
houses depends on boom and bust cycles. During booms, risk aversion declines, and investors are 
more eager to play with new and possibly dangerous instruments. Hence new underwriters have an 
easier time, new debts are successfully issued, and the ability of serious houses to resist the push is 
more limited. To the extent that the market share of prestige is determined by the prestigious 
underwriter’s ability to address asymmetries of information, any perceived reduction in such 
asymmetries heralds an erosion of prestige. During the crisis, however, old lessons are relearned as 
bad borrowers default. Prestige is back, and good countries in trouble can still access the market 
through the help of their elite bank (relationship banking argument). 
To test whether this hypothesized connection is supported by the data, we have identified, within 
our data set of sovereign debt issues during the period 1820–1900, the amount of Rothschilds and non-
Rothschilds issues on a year-by-year basis and then aggregated the numbers, distinguishing between 
boom and bust eras.
22 Previous authors have identified three such cycles in the 19
th century: the early 
1820s boom, which petered out in late 1825 and early 1826 (Jenks 1927; Flandreau and Flores 2009); 
the long boom of the years 1850–1870, which imploded in stages between 1871 and 1876 (Jenks 
1927; Suzuki 1994); and finally the protracted expansion that begun in the late 1870s, stalled in 1889, 
and then reversed with the Argentine default and ―Barings crisis‖ of 1890 (Ford 1962).
23 
The results are shown in Figure 3, which delivers a straightforward message: Rothschilds’s market 
share was typically smaller during periods of expansion in sovereign debt issues and then recuperated 
after the collapse. Matching this evidence, we note that it was actually common among prestigious 
banks to be particularly vocal during busts in emphasizing that investors who had bought through 
lesser houses (in effect, their lower rank competitors) deserved to be punished – the modern word 
would be ―bailed in‖.
24 Beyond the Victorian moral overtones, the prestigious bankers were stating a 
fact they knew quite well. Prestige was counter-cyclical and this was an outcome of game ruled by 
relationship banking. 
 
[[ INSERT Figure 3 about Here]] 
C. The Theory: Tit-for-Tat 
The theory of international lending in the 19
th century is therefore enriched once we recognize that 
there was more to the game between borrowers and capital markets than a confrontation between 
rational  borrowing  governments  and  atomistic  bondholders  seeking  safety  in  collective  action 
institutions. In this section, we discuss theoretical foundations for conditionality lending by special, 
prestigious banks, and use a case study to illustrate the principles we articulate. The evidence surveyed 
                                                       
22 Since there are years without loan issues, adding up numbers over eras makes results more consistent. 
23 The data in Stone (1999) does support the notion of a sudden stop in capital exports in 1889/1890. 
24 In 1828, (i.e. after the 1825-26 market reversal), Alexander Baring had publicly emphasized that bondholders 
were consenting adults who should pay for their ―gambling losses‖ (Quoted in Dawson 1990, p. 193). Similarly, 
the exchange already mentioned with Nathaniel de Rothschild during the hearings of the 1875 Select Committee 
had the banker declaring about the hypothetical Khan of Khiva loan that ―anybody who subscribed to that loan 
must know that he is subscribing to a loan which is utterly worthless‖ (Select Committee, p. 268). 15 
earlier  points  to  a natural  mechanism  whereby  these  special  banks  were in  a  position to  enforce 
adjustments as a quid pro quo for the funds they provided to countries: I shall provide you with funds, 
but your will undertake actions that maximize the likelihood of sustained debt service and in fine 
protect my own reputation. Conditionality lending, we argue, is thus an investment in the bank’s own 
brand. 
The  mechanism  through  which  adjustments  could  be  credibly  enforced  rested  on  the  costs  a 
country—if unwilling to undertake prescribed policy actions in return for funding—would suffer from 
the banker’s retaliation (this is discussed more formally in Appendix A where we provide a marginal 
condition for cooperation). Prestigious houses valued their brand and asked for adjustments that they 
claimed were necessary to protect the country’s credit but the real target and concern was of course the 
bank’s own credit. Countries were thus asked to undertake some costly action. If they refused to 
cooperate, the banker would refuse to provide them with market access. It was not unusual for a 
prestigious banker to make it known that it had refused lending to a certain country.
25 When this 
happened, the country could then turn to a lower-rank underwriter. But the lower-rank underwriter was 
not as prestigious  and so its terms were more onerous (switching was itself viewed as indicating a 
possible problem).
26 The country could also postpone borrowing, or else turn to domestic markets. The 
extent to which its money needs were urgent and its domestic capital markets were well developed 
thus determined its bargaining position with respect to bankers. 
This required adjustment was fully credible in the hands of prestigious banking houses. Indeed, the 
bulk of their revenues stemmed from owning a large market share in successful loan s, not from the 
fees garnered on individual issues. There was thus no trade -off between fees and reputation (unlike 
what previous authors have implied), since the failure of any loan would reverberate across the board 
and so impair the bank’s ability to make other issues of good loans. Therefore, the greater the bank’s 
concern over its brand, the stricter were the required policy actions. Our analysis also suggests that 
prestigious underwriters would not hesitate to enforce a long embargo against deviating countries, and 
there is evidence that this was the case.
27 Quite naturally, a prestigious bank would be unwilling to 
lend to  such  countries  until investors  were  properly compensated, since only full compensation 
ensured restoration of  the banker’s prestige. As we shall see, bankers made sure that bondholders 
received bonuses when they were exposed to undue excitement: sound banking had to be dull. 
Thus prestigious houses were unwilling to undercut the terms of a credit embargo, because they 
were the ones to impose it in the first place. The reason again is that there was no point in preventing 
                                                       
25 . Prestigious bankers were often accused of ―talking down‖ that is  publicly denigrating the stocks they had 
refused to underwrite (Landes 1958). 
26 For a measurement of switching costs, see Flandreau and Flores (2010). 
27 There is indeed anecdotal evidence of such embargoes. Examples include Rothschilds’s experience in the 
1860s with Italy and Austria, both of which sought to impose a capital levy on debts marketed by the House of 
Rothschilds. Since the bonds were initially tax-free, this amounted to a breach of faith or partial default. After 
working to minimize the losses for their investors (e.g., holders of Rothschild-underwritten Austrian bonds were 
given a reasonably favorable conversion rate into the new, taxable securities), Rothschilds walked away from 
both countries (Gille 1967). 16 
investors from being duly compensated by unduly supporting the credit of an undeserving country—a 
bank that did so would disqualify itself as prestigious. Thus, if there was an externality then it was a 
positive one that arose through a kind of ―competition of virtue‖. If the name of the game was the 
bank’s track record, then prestige could only be secured by making sure that harsher terms be applied. 
The outcome squarely opposes the conventional emphasis on free-riding. 
In summary, the claim we make is that, for prestigious bankers, implementing punishment meant 
future rents (the fees from future good loans) rather than forgone revenues (the fees from the bad loans 
they decided not to issue). In the language of theory, the game under consideration is one where 
prestigious intermediaries lend support depending on whether the country’s behavior is proper (i.e., 
cooperative).  Our  theory  of  conditionality  lending  belongs  to  the  ―tit-for-tat‖  or  ―equivalent 
retaliation‖ family of games in which players can sustain a given equilibrium by inflicting adequate 
penalties when another player deviates (the usual reference in this literature is Axelrod 1984). 
 
III. Conditionality Lending and Liquidity Crises: Case Study 
 
A case study will now help us explore the consequences of the previous argument. Through their 
ability to punish countries, prestigious houses acquired leverage over macroeconomic governance. In 
order to show this, we must find an instance where some shock moved a bank–borrower relation off 
equilibrium so that we can observe the resulting adjustments. Yet the very nature of this relation is 
such that observable shocks are rare events (otherwise, the bank would not be prestigious). For this 
reason, the intriguing episode of the 1898 Brazilian ―Funding Loan‖ is precious. At that time, a serious 
fiscal crisis—triggered by the mismatch between Brazil’s debts, which were denominated in sterling, 
and its own depreciating currency—threatened to push Brazil into default. The origins of this episode 
are in the early 1890s, when Brazil, following the so-called Encilhamento, engaged in expansionary 
monetary and banking policies.
28 Expansion of the money supply fueled exchange depreciation.
29 In 
1898, the situation came to the breaking point: had interest service been paid in sterling, it would have 
absorbed 62% of total government revenues.
30 In May 1898, markets  were anxiously expecting a 
moratorium on debt repayment.
31 
However, Brazil was the Rothschilds country par excellence. Table 1 documents the underwriting 
record of Brazilian government loans between the mid-19
th century and the Funding Loan of 1898. 
And shows Rothschilds controlled 100% of the franchise. Some observers were quick to point out that 
Brazil’s problems were indeed a test of Rothschilds’s touch. For instance, when the country’s situation 
                                                       
28 Topik (1987), Triner (2000), Abreu (2006). 
29 On the mismatch problem during the 1890s, see Flandreau (2003a) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004). The 
dangers of such a mismatch were rediscovered during the Asian and Russian crises of the late 1990s. 
30 See Flandreau and Zumer (2004) for an estimate of this counterfactual interest service. Assessment by the 
international banking community put Brazil in the group of countries whose finances were shaky (see Flandreau 
2003b). 
31 ―Brazilian Finance,‖ Investors Monthly Manual (31 May 1898, p. 225). 17 
threatened slipping out of control in the Spring of 1898, the Investors Monthly Manual emphasized 
that the lesson, should default occur, may be that investing classes ―should think for themselves, and 
not  follow  blindly  whoever  chooses  to  lead  them,  whether  Rothschilds  or  Barings,  Barnatos  or 
Hooleys‖ (the latter two were famous swindlers of the time).
32 Some analysts have suggested that 
Rothschilds faced a conflict of interest that would have led it to be too lenient with Brazil and that the 
reason  why  Rothschilds ―bailed  out‖  Brazil  in  1898  reflected  the  bank’s  conflict  of interest.
33  In 
contrast, our argument implies that if Rothschilds did not handle Brazil’s crisis properly (meaning not 
just a bailout but a proper restructuring) then the bank’s ability to underwrite other countries in the 
future would be damaged. Therefore, any support they would give could not be a ―bail out‖. It had to 
be costly for Brazil and rewarding for investors. 
 
[[ INSERT Table 1 about Here]] 
 
Brazil did not default; instead, a Rothschilds-sponsored debt restructuring was organized. The so-
called Funding Loan was announced on 20 June 1898 when Rothschilds asked The Times to publish 
the  correspondence  of  Brazil’s  president-elect  Campos  Salles,  which  emphasized  the  Brazilian 
government’s commitment to fiscal stabilization.
34 The terms of the agreement then became public.
35 
The Funding Loan had two sides, one macroeconomic and one financial. The macroeconomic side was 
summarized  in  the  ―Funding  Scheme‖  appended  to  the  underwriting  contract.
36  This  scheme 
recognized that the source of the crisis was a mixture of monetary and fiscal problems. It was fiscal 
because  the  government  could  not  service  the  debt,  and  it  was  monetary  because  exchange 
depreciation against a sterling debt had exacerbated the debt problem. Funding securities were created 
to pay for the debt and their floating was conitional upon monetary entrenchment: Brazil, under the 
supervision of trustee banks, was instructed to burn paper notes in counterpart (pari passu was the 
chosen wording) to the funds received.
37 The monetarist rationale of the scheme is obvious: reducing 
                                                       
32 Investors Monthly Manual (31 May 1898, p. 226). Barney Barnato, the South African ―Diamond King‖, 
committed suicide in June 1897 by jumping overboard from a vessel on its way from Cape Town. Hooley, 
known as the ―Napoleon of Finance‖, was a promoter of companies who went bankrupt in 1898 amid revelations 
of deceptive accounting practices. Of course, since the Investors Monthly Manual was itself printing 
macroeconomic information and making commentaries, its judgment was not disinterested. 
33 We understand that this argument is also made in an unpublished dissertation by Leonardo Weller, but we 
have not seen this work. See Weller (2009). 
34 Campos Salles was then visiting London and was ―in constant communication with his government on the 
subject‖ (The Times, 20 June 1898). Abreu (2000) suggests that Brazilian authorities did not know Rothschilds 
intended to publicize their correspondence. 
35 The Economist (30 June 1898). 
36 Both the contract and the signed ―United States of Brazil Funding Scheme‖ are located in the Rothschilds 
Archive in London. 
37 ―The paper money equivalent to the Bonds issued from the 1
st of July to the 31
st of December 1898, will be 
deposited [in Trust with the London and River Plate Bank, Limited, the London and Brazilian Bank, Limited, 
and the Brazilianische Bank für Deutschland]. The paper money deposited will either be withdrawn from 
circulation and destroyed, or if the Exchange is favourable, will be applied in the purchase of Bills on London 
[sterling exchange] in favour of Messrs. N. M. Rothschild & Sons, to be placed to the credit of a Fund towards 18 
the money supply would boost the exchange rate and decrease the burden of interest service, enabling 
authorities to resume normal payment of external obligations (of course, the sterling value of the 
nominal debt would increase in response to the issue of additional Funding securities). This is indeed 
what happened: monetary contraction was followed by exchange-rate stabilization. 
Brazilian  historiography  is  uniformly  critical  of  the  dislocating  effect  that  Rothschilds’s 
stabilization program had on Brazil’s domestic economy. Nonetheless, government fiscal balance was 
restored.
38 This result is consistent with our view that the primary  beneficiary of the funding scheme 
was Rothschilds’s own reputation (showing they were no Barnatos), not the Brazilian economy. The 
conclusion becomes even more patent when we examine costing. Recall how Figure 1 and Figure 2 
showed that the Rothschilds prestige depended on predictability of returns. The collapse in Brazilian 
bond prices that occurred before implementation of the Funding Loan dented Rothschilds’s reputation 
for reliability, as the Investors Monthly Manual had reminded investors. The only way to restore 
credibility, therefore, was to find a way to increase ex post returns beyond initial promises (i.e., above 
the 45° line). In other words, it was not enough that investors would eventually receive the full value 
of their expected return. Since they had been harmed by volatility and would blame Rothschilds for 
this,  investors  were  owed  some  compensation:  Brazilian  securities  now  had  to  outperform  initial 
expectations in order to ensure that the Rothschilds seal of approval would not be tarnished. 
The  Funding  Loan  effected  this  compensation  by  distributing  new securities to  the  holders  of 
former ones. In exchange for forbearance, holders of Brazilian debt received Funding securities at 
discount prices. Because the Funding Loan did not have an ―issue price‖ and instead was distributed in 
exchange for coupons that investors turned in, there is no well-defined yield at issue that can be 
compared to other securities issues. However, we can estimate the opportunity cost by looking at the 
short-term  performance  (aka  ―Initial  Public  Offering  discount‖)  of  the  Funding  portfolio.
39  A 
comparison of the Funding portfolio’s price in June 1898 (date of issue) with the first available quote 
of the Funding Loan (on 3 September 1898), a metric known in modern finance as the ―run-up‖ that is 
taken as a measure of the cost of external funding, gives a mammoth increase of 37%.
40 In contrast, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the future payment in Gold of the interest on the Loans etc.‖ United States of Brazil Funding Scheme, p. 2, 
Rothschilds Archive, 000/401 F. 
38 Barroso (1936, pp. 66–67) speaks of ―humiliation‖ and the adverse effects on the economy due to retiring 
papel moneda da circulaçao. Fritsch (1988) states that the deflationary monetary policy had negative effects on 
Brazil’s economy and contributed to the banking crisis of 1900. Topik (1987, p. 38) quotes a contemporary Rio 
newspaper to the effect that Brazil’s economic policy after the Funding Loan led to three years of complete 
stagnation and the unquestionable decline of industrial policy. 
39 By comparing the funding of securities being distributed with the holding of Brazilian debt, we can compute 
the short-term performance of the Funding portfolio consisting of both old debts and new Funding securities (see 
Appendix B for the details). 
40 Modern finance literature recognizes that issuers and underwriters of corporate securities now deliberately 
underprice their issues (see, e.g., Logue 1973; Ibbotson 1975; Miller and Reilly 1987; Carter and Manaster 
1990). 19 
modern  and  historical  run-ups  are  typically  a  few percentage  points at  most.
41  Holders of earlier 
Rothschilds-sponsored securities received this benefit.
42 
Another (perhaps even more appropriate)  way to address the matter is by computing the ex post 
performance of securities that were subjected to the  Funding arrangement (see Appendix B).  When 
doing so, we find that securities such as Brazil’s 1895 5% sterling bonds had an ex post rate of return 
(internal rate of return) of about 8%, substantially more than the yield at issue (5.9%). This 210-basis-
point excess return over investors’ expectations (8% − 5.9%) can be taken as a measure of the reward 
for  trusting  Rothschilds  in  more  difficult  times.  In  view  of  our  earlier  discussion  of  Rothschilds 
delivering reliable returns, the excess performance can be seen as a quid pro quo for investors having 
suffered a bout of uncertainty. 
This conclusion raises two questions: why were the terms of the deal so painful (Brazil emerged 
from the crisis more indebted than before and had to pay extra), and why did Brazil comply? The pain 
inflicted to Brazil is explained in terms of the reputational implications for Rothschilds, which had no 
better way of signaling to the public that Rothschilds was unlike Barnatos. The excess returns (as 
calculated here) also served this purpose and, furthermore, reminded other countries that attempts to 
deviate  were  be  costly.  There  is  little  doubt  that  other  countries  reflected  upon  this  and  that 
Rothschilds’s proven ability to punish was a potent off-equilibrium threat. Hence Rothschilds did not 
have a conflict of interest: the banking house was not helping Brazil, it was delivering value. 
So why did Brazilians comply? The obvious answer is that Rothschilds was in a position to make a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer. It priced the Funding Scheme in a way that reflected Brazil’s outside option 
(default would have led to Brazil’s banishment from Rothschilds-sponsored market access). Given that 
Brazil was on the verge of Bankruptcy and that bankruptcy would have force it to pay much more for 
loans in the future, terms could not be good for the ailing country. The resulting financial triumph (for 
Rothschilds) reflected Brazil’s limited bargaining power. 
Our theoretical characterization may finally be used as a way to provide underpinnings to later 
accusations of ―financial imperialism‖ on behalf of the underwriting banks in lending centers (Hobson 
1902).  Indeed,  conditionality  lending  prospers  on  the  fertile  grounds  of  severe  information 
asymmetries  that  tend  to  expand  during  crises.  Theoreticians  have  considered  situations  where 
informational  symmetries  permit  lenders  to  exploit  borrowers.  This  is  known  as  the  ―hold-up‖ 
problem (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992). It arises when the delegated monitor is able to capture the firm 
and extract a rent. A full investigation of the problem is beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
phenomenon  is  consistent  with  the  negative  assessments  of  the  Funding  Loan  that  are  found  in 
Brazilian historiography. 
 
                                                       
41 See the works cited in note 43 as well as the historical numbers reported in Flandreau and Flores (2009). 
42 Investigation of the Rothschilds Archive shows that the bank was long on Brazilian bonds and thus shared in 
some of the gains from the large run-up. 20 
IV. Solvency Crises: Barings in the Market for Distressed Debt 
In Hamlet, the Ghost is a critical character because his demand for revenge impels the drama’s action. 
In our financial drama, the bondholders’ concern for getting their money back plays a similar role. But 
it takes a prestigious bank to acknowledge some liability and become involved. Consistently with what 
we have argued so far, it is no surprise that prestigious houses became involved in dealing with 
distressed debt. There is much anecdotal evidence of both borrowers and bondholders realizing that 
the involvement of prestigious bank houses could create value.
43 
To discuss the involvement of prestigious banks in debt collection  we focus now on Barings, which 
was ―number two‖ in London’s foreign government debt market. The available evidence establishes 
two types of settings in which Barings dealt with countries’ debt problems. First, there were situations 
where Barings dealt with countries with which they had been associated and that run into trouble. The 
archetypal instance was the ―Romero‖ arrangement secured by Barings from Argentina in 1893 after 
that country defaulted on securities that, although not underwritten by Barings, had been distributed in 
London  through  Barings  offices.
44  Second, and  perhaps  more importantly, were instances where 
Barings involved itself with securities that it had neither originated nor distributed. Although Barings 
may have borne some residual reputational liabilities for   not discouraging  their customers  from 
subscribing to certain debt issues, the very fact that Barings had neither underwritten nor distributed 
the  securities  was a clear signal of  its  reservations.
45  As early as 1822, when  Barings  agreed  to 
distribute securities of the province of Buenos Aires , it emphasized to purchasers that  it was not 
underwriting the securities and was not recomm ending their purchase. Therefore, getting into the 
market for a defaulted bond not its own cannot be rationalized solely in terms of liability management, 
as in the case of the conditionality discussed in the previous sections. 
We argue that the motivations for a prestigious bank entering the market for defaulted bonds were 
not unlike those for creating the junk bond market in the 1970s. Defaulted debt tends to have a high 
yield and will provide handsome returns—provided the issues eventually perform. Now suppose that 
                                                       
43 For instance, Salvucci quotes an official in defaulted Mexico declaring, in 1829, that ―We should avail 
ourselves of the prestige that Rothschild’s name brings to reconcile ourselves with European creditors and to 
strengthen our own credit.‖ Salvucci (2009, p. 109). And as reported by Jenks, CFB architect Isidor Gerstenberg 
offered Baron Lionel Rothschilds chairmanship of the Corporation’s first meeting in 1868. Jenks (1927, p. 288) 
relies on a paper by de Laveleye in Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels (15 November 1868). 
44 For more on the Continental syndicates, see Flores (2004); for more on the Arreglo Romero arrangement of 
1893, see Marichal (1989). 
45 Previous scholars have discussed the extent to which Barings may have had some residual liability in certain 
U.S. states for having contributed to the distribution of debt gone bad. Hidy (1949, p. 313) suggests that Barings 
was not at all exposed, whereas McGrane (1935, pp. 49, 73) implies that Barings had unloaded some American 
stocks on their clients and would therefore have borne some liability. It is unlikely that Barings’s exposure was 
high, given that the bank does not appear in the 1838 Fortune’s Epitome as an agent for cashing the coupon of 
any American state except Louisiana. Tamaki (1974, pp. 64, 66) argues that American securities were not traded 
in the London stock exchange but only over the counter in pools managed by merchant bankers who also 
distributed relevant information on bond prices. At one time Barings published a circular that, in the mid-1830s, 
recorded not only commodity prices and some securities (e.g.,stock of the Second Bank of the United States) but 
also the loans of ―New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Alabama‖. Whatever liability such publication may have 
created, it was obviously of a lesser sort than the liability created by underwriting and distribution. 21 
some prestigious bank is able to inflict penalties to defaulters by denigrating the security. The bank 
will then be able, at the margin, to create incentives for renegotiating other intermediaries’ countries’ 
defaulted debt. This is because the prestigious bank is in a stronger position than are ordinary bankers 
to provide enforcement services. The incentives may not be perfect and there may be many failures 
along the way; however, for a sufficient number of these debts, the ex post return will match the ex 
ante (high) yield and so, on average, a portfolio consisting of Barings securities will be attractive. 
This, we argue, explains why Barings stepped into the speculative grade bond market. 
Secondary  accounts  of  the  history  of  the  House  of Barings  are  replete  with  evidence  of  such 
involvement in other bankers’ nonperforming securities. Useful material on the role of Barings in 
sorting out the U.S. states’ debt crises during the 1840s can be found in McGrane (1935) and Hidy 
(1949).
46 Evidence on the role of Barings in dealing with defaulted debts in Latin America throughout 
the 19
th century is given by Marichal (1989), Dawson (1990), Costeloe (2003), and Salvucci (2009).
47 
Sexton (2005) surveys the role of Barings in both Americas. 
We organized a case study of Barings in the  U.S. states’ debt crises in the 1840s by combining 
information on US States defaults from English (1996) and Kim and Wallis (2005). From English 
(1996) we classified borrowing U.S. states as nondefaulters, temporary defaulters, partial repudiators, 
or total repudiators. From Kim and Wallis (2005) and CFB reports we collected additional information 
on duration of default and other relevant details. We then turned to Fortune’s Epitome (editions of 
1838 and 1856) to collect information on the ―window‖ that different US states used to service their 
debt before and after the crisis. Finally, we used material from McGrane (1935) and Hidy (1949) to 
construct—based on the language used in these sources—a qualitative indicator of the effort Barings 
made to persuade defaulting states to resume their interest payments. For instance, Barings reportedly 
made ―considerable‖ efforts (some public, some undercover) in Pennsylvania, but they gave ―never 
more than half hearted support to any move‖ toward restoration of good faith in Mississippi.
48 
 
[[ INSERT Table 2 about Here]] 
 
Table 2 shows that Barings’s efforts were more pronounced in states that ended up paying back. 
Barings was heavily involved in three (Illinois, Maryland and Pennsylvania) of the four states for 
which there was only a temporary lapse in the coupon payment. This involvement included press 
campaigns,  articles  for  hire,  subsidized  lobbying  efforts  in  legislatures,  and  so  forth.  One  state 
(Illinois) in this group was handled on a U.S.-only basis with the involvement of a New York business 
group, which suggests that the holdings of Illinois bonds in Europe were never large. Of the states 
characterized by partial or complete repudiation, Barings became seriously involved with only one 
                                                       
46 Because U.S. states are subsovereign entities, they are excluded from Flandreau et al. (2010). 
47 Our firsthand knowledge of the Barings Archive in London indicates that these accounts probably cover most 
of the relevant material. 
48 Hidy (1949, p. 336). 22 
(Louisiana) and eventually managed to restore that state’s credit. For the rest of the delinquent states, 
Barings accommodated to some degree the involvement of other bankers and interest groups (in some 
cases, efforts were made by the underwriters); however, the results were uniformly discouraging. Of 
course, we know nothing of the ―objective‖ difficulty involved in convincing various states to resume 
payments beyond the evidence surviving in the archives. Even so, Table 2 is consistent with our 
argument about reputational spillover: when it tried to coerce defaulters into paying back, Barings was 
actually most interested in future business. Note that Barings was a window for many more states after 
the crisis than before. Later on, it would underwrite Virginia and Massachusetts.
49 
Latin America is another place where  the intervention of Barings can be observed.  During the 
1820s,  for  instance,  Alexander  Baring  was  asked  twice  (in  1826  and  1829)  by  the  Mexican 
government to pay the coupon on bonds that had been u nderwritten by Barclay, Herring and 
Richardson. Baring accepted the first time but declined agency the second time because his conditions 
had  not  been  met.  The  language  used  is  consistent  with  the  retaliatory  game  conducive  to 
conditionality lending (discussed previously): ―I cannot consent‖, Baring said, ―to risk my name when 
I see no positive indication of the actual fulfillment of the promises and pledges which would be given 
through my intervention as agent of the government.‖
50 Barings played a prominent role again in 
1862, and in 1864 it resumed its role as Mexican agent in London.
51 Barings also acted in Venezuela, 
proposing an arrangement for the second Venezuelan default of 1847 , and in Chile, where in 1840 it 
intervened  in  the  arrangement  of  Chile’s  default  on  an  1826  loan.
52  The view that Barings  was 
―Argentina’s  banker‖  has  been  proven  wrong,  since  many  other  bankers  originated  Argentine 
government debt (In this sense, the link between Argentina and Barings was not the same as the link 
between Brazil and Rothschilds). But it is fair to say that Barings was Argentina’s trouble-shooter, 
since it was involved in fixing more than one of the country’s crises.
53 We thus conclude that Barings’ 
brand, aside Rothschilds, served differentiated purpose of finding values where there were more risk 
involved and certifying more dangerous countries. This ―market specialization‖ cannot be entirely 
foreign to the shock the Bating received from a spillover of the Argentibe default of 1890, causing the 
                                                       
49 See Hidy (1949, p. 311) for a similar inference: ―Although the name of Baring Brothers and Company had 
never been publicly associated with the loans from Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, or Pennsylvania, any 
improvement in the credit of those states would redound indirectly to the good name of those with which the 
House of Baring did have intimate connections. The reputation of Louisiana, South Carolina, Maryland, and 
Massachussetts, and of the Merchants Exchange, with which the name of Baring Brothers & Cy had been 
publicly connected, would be expected to improve as a result of the investors associating them with those States 
of rejuvenated credit.‖ 
50 Alexander Baring, June 1829, quoted in Costeloe (2003, p. 164). In February 1825, speaking before the House 
of Commons, Baring warned of the danger that the Latin American debt mania of the early 1820s was interfering 
with ―legitimate loan-making‖ (Hidy 1949, p. 67). Baring emphasized that bondholders were consenting adults 
who should not expect governments to insure their ―gambling losses‖. He saw wisdom and benefit in a market 
crash that would restore judgment; see Dawson (1990, p. 193). 
51 ―Baring Accepts to Represent Bondholders,‖ ING Barings Archive, 204326. See also Costeloe (2003, p. 85). 
52 Dawson (1990, pp. 199, 207). 
53 Ferns (1952, p. 242). 23 
bank to go bust, and the Bank of England to reconstruct it, so that it could be reinvented and floated 
again, with benefit for the City. 
A question still pending is the reason for the existence of two different uses of prestige, Barings’s 
and  Rothschilds’s.  Although  additional  research  is  needed  to  provide  a  full  explanation,  we  can 
advance some tentative hypotheses here. As we have seen, the Rothschilds imprimatur was about 
reliability of returns (i.e., minimizing the spread between ex ante and ex post returns) so that investors 
could reasonably expect to know how much they would profit. As the case of Brazil demonstrates, in 
the rare instance when problems occurred, Rothschilds provided extra returns to compensate investors 
for the rough ride. In contrast, Barings’s commitment is best understood as minimizing variance in the 
performance of the portfolio of securities with which they were involved, not about the performance of 
individual securities. Some deals could fall through (they would be located below the 45° line), but on 
average the portfolio would be successful. 
Could each bank compete in each other’s domain? In other words, could Rothschilds undertake 
riskier deals? In theory, nothing prevents one brand from operating in two markets  -- provided that 
proper instruments are available to differentiate the two types of deals. Yet nothing like that existed. 
Unless Rothschilds found a way to send clear signals regarding the group of deal in which they were 
entering  would  have  invariably  led  investors  to  wonder  ex  post  whether  the  deal  failed  because 
Rothschilds was imitating Barings, or because they had made some miscalculation. 
Given this, engaging in both lines of business at once would have inevitably created conflicts of 
interests. One way to understand this is to think of the differentiation between Barings and Rothschilds 
in terms of the familiar opposition between solvency and liquidity. As the previous discussion has 
shown, the types of crisis management that the two leading banks got involved into corresponded 
respectively to liquidity (Rothschilds) or solvency (Barings) problems. Because such problems are 
distinct and call for distinct solutions, it may therefore seem quite natural to think that the 19
th century 
London market for foreign debt somehow found a way to differentiate among them. 
For  this  reason,  and  given  (as  argued  by  Flandreau  and  Flores  2009)  that  Rothschilds  had 
deliberately  taken  a  lead  in  the  market  for  precise  predictions,  Barings  probably  had  no  other 
alternative than to specialize in riskier instruments if it wanted to claw back its way into the market for 
foreign government debt. The natural tendency of reputation to persist as its owner seeks to protect 
accruing rents may have sealed Barings’s fate, just like it did for Rothschilds. Rothschilds ended up in 
prime debt, Barings in ―top subprime‖. This shadow has extended until today. We were struck by a 
remark from an old hand in the trade who was in charge of granting archive research authorization for 
Hambros, a merchant bank. As we traded jikes about various banks, he exclaimed as if he spoke the 
obvious: ―Oh, but Barings were always more sanguine!‖
54 
 
                                                       
54 Interview with the authors. 24 
V. Closing the Loop: Bondholders versus Bond Sellers 
We  shall  now  compare  in  a  more  systematic  fashion  the  effect  of  bankers  and  bondholders’ 
committees on performance. Earlier assessments have sought to relate the creation of certain structures 
(e.g., the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders) on recovery rates, and previous studies have compared 
the pre-CFB experience with the CFB experience. The period before 1868 is characterized by fairly 
long time intervals before countries accepted settlements. Marichal (1989, p. 60) reports on the length 
of debt renegotiation periods for Latin American countries after their defaults in the 1820s, finding 
that they ―generally lasted between fifteen and thirty years.‖ Suter (1992, p. 91) consults a variety of 
sources in examining the default record of a number of loans issued between 1821 and 1875.
55 The 
average lengths of default are 14 years for the period 1821–1870, 6.3 years for 1871–1925, and 10.1 
years for 1926–1975 (the gross average default length for 1821–1975 was 9.2). Some authors have 
seen these and similarly derived numbers as evidencing a positive effect of the CFB’s creation in 
1868.
56 
Likewise, we may co mpare the duration of default when prestigious banks were  and were not 
involved. For instance, a simple  back-of-the-envelope calculation of the average time  elapsed before 
an agreement was reached with bondholders for a debt restructuring  after the 1820s defaults gives an 
average of 16 years for Barings protégés against 30 years for other Latin American countries. Thus, 
Barings-supported deals  are at the short end of  Marichal’s range and the rest are at the long end. 
However,  such  exercises,  regardless  of  the  care  taken,  are  rife  with  methodological  challenges 
especially as regards comparing time series evidence. That is, such calculations presuppose that we 
can compare the nature of defaults across time periods—yet the timing of the trade cycle probably 
affected countries’ willingness to cooperate with bondholders.
57 An additional complication is that, 
given  the  long  life  of  bonds,  countries  that  had  defaulted  once  tended  to  default  again  after  the 
securities  had  been  reconstructed.  Because  various  market  participants  were  involved  at  various 
stages,  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  provide  a  convincing  explanation  that  relates  settlements, 
performance, and intermediaries. An exhaustive archival search (to the extent that the material has 
survived) might provide some insight and help construct high-quality indicators, but the results would 
hardly be falsifiable. Moreover, we have shown that prestigious bankers provided the incentive and 
means for countries not to default, so such measurements would be biased even in this best-case 
scenario. The measurements would not take into account all the problems that did not ultimately result 
in default. 
                                                       
55 His computations are based on Suter (1992), who gives as sources The Economist and the publications of 
bondholders’ associations in England, France, and Belgium. 
56 A recent study along these lines is Esteves (2007). 
57 . For instance, we observe that a substantial number of the 1820s defaults that Barings had not yet fixed were 
finally sorted out in the 1850s (hence our 30-year estimate), a period when global trade was booming, enabling 
merchant banks which were involved in both trade finance and bond underwriting to use whatever levegare they 
could muster to encourage debtors to settle. In a distinct, but related vein, Vizcarra (2006) argues that merchant 
bankers could use trade as a collateral for government debt. 25 
Here we deal with this challenge by providing a novel approach to the problem of determining 
who—the CFB or the bankers—had the most signaling power. Specifically: rather than comparing 
recovery rates, we look at market reaction to the announced involvement of either of the two parties 
with a stake in recovery. First, we ask whether creation of the CFB had any effect on the price of more 
speculative debt. Had investors believed the CFB would increase the likelihood of their receiving 
higher future returns, then the price of riskier countries’ securities should have been driven upward. 
This is especially so because the CFB had not been anticipated but gained lots of visibility when it was 
set up in November 1868.
58 
We  selected  three ―typical‖  delinquent countries (Egypt,  Columbia,  and Venezuela)  for  which 
reasonably reliable price series are available. We then examined the reaction of their bond prices to the 
November 1868 announcement. Despite the attempts of promoters, the CFB’s first meeting did not 
formally involve prestigious bankers. Looking at bond prices for high-yield borrowers around the date 
on which the CFB was created is thus a ―pure‖ test of the CFB’s own credibility.
59 The results are 
plotted in Figure 4a, b and c. As the graphs indicate, the CFB’s creation made no impression on the 
markets. This important result has apparently been missed or overlooked in previous research. 
 
[[ INSERT Figure 4 about Here]] 
[[ INSERT Figure 5 about Here]] 
 
Next, we selected a number of episodes during which (i) bondholders acted on their own, (ii) 
bondholders acted in conjunction with prestigious bankers, or (iii) prestigious bankers acted on their 
own. Case (i) is illustrated by the record of two of the countries targeted by the CFB some time after 
its creation (Figure 4.a and c): Venezuela (June 1869, when a CFB-mandated commission went to 
Venezuela to deal with default) and Egypt (in April 1870, when bondholders tried to activate a clause 
of a 1868 loan with the Imperial Ottoman Bank that precluded new issues after Egypt entered into 
discussions with Bischoffsheim for a new issue). Case (ii) is illustrated by Columbia (Figure 4.b). On 
17 May 1870, The Times mentioned that a meeting of Columbian bondholders had been convened by 
the CFB and that resolutions for action were adopted. It was further announced that the action (unlike 
similar events for Venezuela and Egypt) would be conducted ―in conjunction with Messrs. Baring‖ 
(emphasis added).
60 
                                                       
58 On the CFB as a surprise, see Jenks (1927) and Platt (1968). Our search (under such headings as 
―bondholders‖) through indexes for the British press of previous years did not discover any mention of the 
project. When the first meeting took place, however, it received much publicity and was amply covered by the 
British and Continental newspapers. 
59 The CFB was created on 12 November 1868, if we are to believe the Daily Telegraph (13 November 1868), or 
on 11 November, according to The Economist (14 November 1868), which mentions a meeting on 
―Wednesday‖, and to Wynne and Borchard (1933). 
60 The Times went on to state that ―thanks were at the same time given to Messrs. Baring for the interest they 
have invariably taken in the affairs of the holders of the New Granada [Colombia’s predecessor state] bonds‖ 26 
Finally, case (iii) is illustrated by one episode in which Barings acted on its own (Figure 5, which 
shows yields on Mexican debt, rather than bond prices). To avoid giving bankers an unfair advantage 
(bondholders were untested in 1868, but Barings had been around for some time), we picked an 
episode from the mid-1820s—a time when Barings was still new to the Latin American debt game. In 
February 1826, Mexican authorities with struggling finances, had lost their London window when the 
house of Barclay, Herring and Richardson (underwriter and distributor for Mexico) collapsed. They 
looked for someone to take care of the coupon, and Barings accepted in September 1826.
61 Barings 
sought to use their position to encourage Mexico to make adjustments and even advanced funds for 
the payment of the coupon.
62 However, Barings soon decided it was not satisfied with the situation and 
so, between late August and September 1827, agency was transferred to an ordinary house.
63 Mexico 
then defaulted on 1 October 1827. 
We already saw that the creation of the CFB left market unimpressed. Likewise, we see that when 
the CFB announced action, markets did not react (Figure 4.a and c). However, when the CFB could 
boast the support of Barings, there was a noticeable upward movement in prices (Figure 4.b). We 
therefore conclude that the CFB’s ability to inflict punishment was credible only when backed by a 
prestigious  house.  Finally,  Figure  5  shows  that  markets  reacted  strongly  to  two  key  events  by 
definition unrelated to the CFB: (1) news that Barings was assuming agency in September 1826 (good 
news  for  yields,  which  went  down);  and  (2)  news  that  Barings  was  surrendering  agency  in 
August/September 1827 (bad news for yields, which went back up).
64 Of particular interest is that the 
actual default (announced 1 October 1827) had less of an effect than losing the Barings connection 
August/September 1827.
65 The implication is straightforward. The ability of prestigious banks to drive 
bond prices was enormous and  bondholders were,  in comparison, as  the Ghost in  Hamlet: able to 
haunt but not to act. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper has provided what we hope is a more complete sketch of 19
th-century global financial 
architecture. Our account is at odds with recent macroeconomic history research on the record of 
foreign debt and its focus on country characteristics and the interaction with bondholders. On the other 
hand,  our  new  approach  does  share  much  insight  with  recent  financial  economics  emphasis  on 
relationship banking. It is also related to earlier business historians’ emphasis on prestige. Yet our 
view differs from these scholars’ accounts in (1) organizing a more systematic argument about why 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and emphasized that bondholders were in ―confidence in the good faith and favourable disposition of that 
Government [Colombia]‖ (The Times, 17 May 1870). 
61 Costeloe (2003), Dawson (1990), Ziegler (1988, pp. 105–106). 
62 The March 1827 coupon was paid ―courtesy of Baring Brothers‖ (Dawson 1990, p. 147). 
63 Reid, Irving, a ―second rank‖ house according to Hidy (1941). 
64 Dawson (1990, pp. 128, 147) and Hidy (1949, p. 66) claim that the announcement of the transfer of agency to 
Reid, Irving ―precipitated a heavy selling wave‖. See also Dawson (1990, pp. 147, 148), Hidy (1949, p. 66), and 
Costeloe (2003). 
65 April and July 1827, when the coupon was not paid by Mexico, are not reported but are easy to locate. 27 
prestige was so important and (2) providing data to illustrate the effects of prestige and (3) identifying 
degrees of prestige as well as different ways of using prestige. 
Rothschilds reigned supreme in ―investment grade‖ bonds, while Barings provided the backbone of 
a more sanguine market and became akin to a subprime debt collection agency. Both firms’ ownership 
of  quality  signals  put  them  in  a  position  to  implement  conditionality  lending  and  to  demand 
adjustments. This power also rendered them dependent on making ends meet because adjustments 
were ultimately investments in their own brands. They had ―skin in the game‖ (their reputation was at 
stake) and this played a disciplining role that cast doubt on earlier claims that free riding was a serious 
obstacle to sound underwriting. 
Finally, we examined empirically the relative powers of bankers and bondholders. We found the 
latter to be quite powerless. In fact, in a striking rejection of some critical assumptions of earlier 
research, we found that bond prices of the more exotic borrowers were unmoved by the creation in 
1868 of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. We argued that this nonresponse indicated that the 
CFB was definitely not taken by contemporaries as seriously as it would be by modern research. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the new perspective articulated here is that, although other 
scholars  have  made  progress  in  embedding  important  elements  of  ―personal  exchange‖  into  the 
development of broader markets based on ―impersonal exchange‖, global finance had not yet emerged 
as a candidate for this kind of reconstruction.
66 Perhaps scholars believed that global finance and 
macroeconomy was just too big to fit into such categories. However, our analysis takes us straight into 
a ―global financial system‖ version of stories told by neoinstitutionalists about how some social ties 
facilitate enforcement of contracts. In our narrative, a market institution (prestige and concentration of 
market power) plays this role and lends itself also to a new explanation of why British policy makers 
had many powerful tools (apart from its seldom mobilized Navy) that could be relied on to ―manage‖ 
the global capital market. British leaders may have rightly believed that the market would take care of 
itself. More probably, they knew that this market was guided by two, quite visible hands (Rothschilds 
and Barings)—those at the center of the debt restructuring table. 
Of course, these conclusions raise one further question: Why was the CFB created when it was 
created? Although we have proved that bondholders did not do what previous scholars claimed they 
did, we must still explain why bondholders were incorporated. If bondholders’ committees are not 
unlike the Ghost in Hamlet then future research will have to find a place for them—lest they return to 
haunt the literature. 
 
                                                       
66 See Lamoreaux (1994) for an illustration of this phenomenon in the case of corporate and individual lending. 28 
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Appendix A: A Condition under which Conditionality Lending Applies 
It  is  possible  to  derive  a  formula  for  the  loss  that  prestigious  banks  could  inflict  on  defaulting 
countries. The formula compares the cost ro,t of future market access (at date t) under the sponsorship 
of an ordinary bank (equivalent to self-certification, since ordinary banks add no value) with the cost 
rp,t of market access under the sponsorship of a prestigious bank. Assuming that the credit embargo 
lasts for T periods and that the country intended to borrow an amount Ak in each period of the embargo 
(here k is the time index), we may calculate the penalty P for default (where i is the discount factor) as 
 
P
ro,k rp,k   Ak
1i  kt kt
tT

  (1) 
And cooperation will apply if the benefits from defaulting are lower than the costs. Some elements 
of this formula are worth mentioning: First, the value obtained is a lower bound. Countries sponsored 
by ordinary underwriters may find themselves unable to borrow in some states of nature. Second, the 
only way for a country to make money on defaults is if the amount of capital appropriated (assuming 
the loan is never paid back) is greater than the loss entailed  by future punishment. This result may 
obtain in countries plagued by coups (i.e., with short-term horizons) or when bankers are not prudent 
enough to improve monitoring  by making  small successive loans ( resulting in a high amount   of 
defaulted debt). Third, the figures involved in the punishment formula are  substantial. Flandreau and 
Flores (2010) report spreads for upgrades from extreme information asymmetries  of nearly 300 basis 
points. For the case of a perpetual bond (a good approximation of the typical loan of the time) and a 
5% yield for prestigious loans (a convenient  though conservative rounding-up of numbers), a  300-
basis-point increase in yield means a reduction in the effective capital borrowed (for any given amount 
of nominal debt) of about 40%. The conclusion that follows from this is that prestigious bankers held a 
powerful tool for increasing the cost of market access for countries that refused to cooperate. 
 
Appendix B: Returns from the Funding Loan of 1898 
The Brazilian Funding loan of 1898 was a debt rescheduling whereby Brazil paid the interest on a 
number of external obligations (e.g., the internal gold loan of 1879) and on railway guarantees for 
three  years  (1  July  1898  through  30  June  1901)  with  the  help  of  new  securities.  A  variety  of 
documents (kept in the Rothschilds Archive) describe the obligations of the Funding Loan, which are 
contained in the Funding Loan contract and the ―Funding Scheme‖. These, along with the ―General 
Bond‖, are our main sources. The General Bond and Funding Scheme stated that Brazil was to deposit 
(in  different  banks)  the  equivalent  amount  of  the  Funding  bonds  issued  between  1  July  and  1 
December 1899 in paper money at the exchange rate of 18d. The paper money so deposited was to be 
withdrawn from circulation and destroyed. 
The exchange of coupons worked as follows. In return for their coupons, holders would receive a 
receipt for the amount lodged (i.e., for the nominal value of the coupon presented). Four £5 coupons 
gave an investor the right to one Funding security. The Funding securities would be distributed in lieu 
of the coupon for three years. 
The outcome of the Funding Loan received was heavily criticized by the opposition party in Brazil 
(Abreu  2002).  In  London,  its  terms  received  generally  favorable  coverage,  although  some  critics 
complained that the CFB had not been involved in the negotiations prior to the final agreement; see for 
example The Economist (18 June 1898) and Freeman’s Journal and Daily Commercial Advertiser (18 
June 1898). Our own archival evidence shows that Rothschilds kept the CFB informed on the progress 
of negotiations with the Brazilian government (Letter to William Lideradle, Chairman of the Council 
of  Foreign  Bondholders,  6  June  1898,  Box  000/401  F,  Rothschilds  Archive).  In  fact,  many 
publications praised the macroeconomic and financial adjustment that Brazil had agreed to undertake 
and celebrated that, during this period, investors would receive ―negotiable securities for the amount 
of their claims‖ and thus would be duly compensated (Daily News, 16 June 1898). 
In effect, investors had little to complain about. We state in the text that the short-term gain of the 
Funding Loan was 37%. This number was calculated as follows. On the Funding Loan’s day of issue, 
holders of the 1895 5% Brazilian securities received—in lieu of a coupon—one Funding security for 
every four bonds. Because the 5% Brazilian bonds then stood at £61, the cost of replacing them with 
the Funding security was 4 × £61 = £244 each. On the first day  that Funding bonds were quoted 34 
(September 3), each 5% bond traded at £62.75 while funding bonds were sold at £80. By that date, the 
first of five coupons had been paid. The portfolio’s value was thus £336 for a gain of £92, which 
represents an increase of 92 ÷ 244 = 37.7%. 
Let’s now compare the returns to investors under a hypothetical scenario in which no restructuring 
or  moratoria  occurred.  We  do this  by  calculating  the  ex post  internal rates of  return (IRRs)  of  a 
portfolio consisting of four 1895 5% Brazilian bonds and then comparing the Funding Loan scenario 
with the non-Funding, no-default scenario. (Of course, without the Funding there might have been a 
default,  but  we  seek  to  compare  what  investors  would  have  legitimately  expected  given  that 
Rothschilds securities were quasi-risk-free.) 
The IRR is calculated as the constant compounded rate that equalizes the product of actual annual 
rates of returns.
67 The IRR gives an indication of the long -term performance of a bond during its 
lifetime.
68 Examining these rates for the totality of Brazilian external bonds during the 19
th and early 
20
th centuries, Abreau (2006) concludes that the general performance was higher than American or 
British bonds (albeit with a higher standard deviation). Abreu (2002) focuses on the Brazilian funding 
loans that took place in 1898, 1914, and 1931 and demonstrates that the IRRs for these loans were 
much higher than those on other, risk-free assets (U.K. and U.S. bonds). 
 
Table A.1. Internal Rate of Return for 1895 Bond under Alternative Scenarios 
Bonds  1895 5% with 
Funding Loan 
since June 1898 
Counterfactual: 1895 
5% without Funding 
Loan since June 
1898 
1895 5% since 
issue date with 
Funding Loan 
Counterfactual: 
1895 5% since 
issue date without 
Funding Loan 
IRR  32.0%  14.4%  11.5%  3.3% 
Source: Authors’ computations (see Appendix text). 
 
We  construct  our  IRR  as  follows.  First  we  look  at  the  precise  conditions  under  which  a 
bondholder of Brazilian bonds could exchange his coupons with Funding bonds, and then we look at 
the performance of the four 5% 1895 bonds. Next we compare this performance with a counterfactual 
scenario in which the investor continued to receive punctual payments of coupons. 
The conditions of the Funding Loan required an investor to present the coupons of the defaulting 
bonds as they became due for exchange into Funding bonds during the period of the ―moratorium‖ 
(three years between 1898 and 1901).
69 These Funding bonds were listed securities that provided an 
annual 5% interest rate in cash and were to be amortized by a sinking fund of 0.5% yearly. This means 
that any calculation of the IRR should take into account price changes for both the 5% 1895 bonds and 
the Funding bonds that an investor would successively receive as well as the coupon payments for 
these bonds. We focus on the years during which the Funding bonds were issue; that is, w e begin our 
computations in June 1898 and continue until 1901. Taking a longer time horizon does not affect the 
basic results. We also compute IRRs since the issue date of the 1895 5% bonds. All results are shown 
in Table A.1. 
The differences in IRRs are s triking. If we concentrate only in the Funding Loan period, the 
ex post IRR with Funding Loan more than doubles the counterfactual no-default scenario (second and 
third columns).
70 The last two columns measure IRRs since the issue date of the 5% 1895 bonds.  The 
values are lower because prices decreased continuously in the years previous to 1898. Still, the 
                                                       
67 If we denote by t0 the date of issue, by pt the price in late December of year t, by pt+1 the price in late 
December of year t + 1, and by dt+1 the dividend paid during year t + 1, then the annual rate of return is 




 1r t  
tt0
1830   which can be solved for . 
68 See Flandreau and Flores (2009), who adopt the same method advanced by Eichengreen and Portes (1989). 
69 The Funding Loan also suspended the sinking fund, and redemption of the defaulting loans was suspended for 
13 years. 
70 Strictly speaking, our calculations do not exactly measure the same IRR: we take into account both the old 5% 
1895 bonds and the Funding bonds, whereas Abreu takes into account only the price movements and coupons 
received of the Funding bonds. Nonetheless, the 32% IRR is comparable to Abreu’s (2002) calculations of the 
average yearly ex post IRR for the totality of the Funding bonds life, which imply maximum annual IRRs of 
29.14% (Abreu 2002, p. 537, Table 5). 35 
difference  is  substantial  and  demonstrates  that,  in  any  case,  investors  did  obtain  major  gains  by 
keeping the old bonds during these crisis years. 
 36 
Figure 1. Brands, Risk, and Performance in the mid-19
th-Century Debt Crisis 
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Source: Authors’ computations from authors’ database. 
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Figure 2. Turnover and Spreads 





































Source: From Flandreau et al. (2010). 
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Figure 3. Countercyclical Prestige: Rothschilds’ Market Shares during Booms and Busts 












Source: Authors’ computations from authors’ database. 
Note: Boom and bust periods were assigned as follows: for ―1820s‖, boom 1821–1825 and bust 1826–1838; for 
―1860s‖, boom 1864–1870 and bust 1871–1877; for ―1880s‖, boom 1878–1888 and bust 1889–1896. 
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Figure 4. Bondholders’ Actions and Government Bonds 
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Figure 5. Effects of Announcement of Barings’s Agency on Mexican Bonds 
























































































































































































































































































































Table 1. Brazilian Issues, 1850–1914 
Year and coupon  Date of 
issue 
Spread at issue  Nominal amount 
(₤ million) 
Underwriter 
1852 4.5%  Jul 1852  1.7  1  Rothschilds 
1858 4.5%  May 1858  1.6  1.5  Rothschilds 
1860 4.5%  Mar 1860  1.8  1.4  Rothschilds 
1863 4.5%  Oct 1863  1.9  3.9  Rothschilds 
1865 5%  Sept 1865  3.4  6.9  Rothschilds 
1871 5%  Feb 1871  2.3  3.4  Rothschilds 
1875 5%  Jan 1875  1.9  5.3  Rothschilds 
1883 4.5%  Jan 1883  2.2  4.6  Rothschilds 
1886 5%  Feb 1886  2.5  6  Rothschilds 
1888 4.5%  Apr 1888  2  6  Rothschilds 
1889 4%  Oct 1889  1.8  20  Rothschilds 
1893 5%  Apr 1893  3.7  2.7  Rothschilds 
1895 5%  Jul 1895  3.5  7.4  Rothschilds 
1898 Funding 5%  Jun 1898  N.A.  8.6  Rothschilds 
1901 4%  Mar 1901  N.A.  14.6  Rothschilds 
1903 5%  May 1903  2.8  5.5  Rothschilds 
1905 5%  Jun 1905  2.3  3  Rothschilds 
1906 5%  Apr 1906  2.4  1.1  Rothschilds 
1907 5%  Oct 1907  2.2  3  Rothschilds 
1908 5%  Jul 1908  2.3  4  Rothschilds 
1910 4%  May 1910  1.4  1  Rothschilds 
1910 4%  Feb 1910  1.5  10  Rothschilds 
1913 5%  May 1913  1.8  11  Rothschilds 
 
Source: Authors’ database (see description in text). 
Note: One small corporate loan issued in 1911 and underwritten by the South American Railway Construction Company, 
related to Lloyds Bank and including special guarantees, is not included. 42 
Table 2. The 1840s U.S.State Debt Crisis and the House of Barings 




Barings’ Action (d)  Outcome (e) 
NON-DEFAULTERS (WITH A DEBT LISTING IN LONDON ACCORDING TO SOURCES) 
Alabama   Th. Wilson, Irving 
Reid 
 Rothschild 
 Union Bank of 
London 
No need  -- 
Georgia  --   ―In London‖ (f)  No need  -- 
Massachusetts  --   Baring  No need  -- 
New York   ―In London‖  --  No need  -- 
South Carolina  --   Baring 
 Palmer, Mackillop & 
Dent 
No need  -- 
Virginia  --   Baring  No need  -- 
TEMPORARY DEFAULT 
Illinois  --  --  Barings campaign with 
others 
4 years: Resumption 
1846 
Indiana   Morrisson, Cryder 
and Co 
--  Butler: New York 
Businessman 
6 years: Resumption 
1847 
Maryland  --   Baring  Barings wages costly 
campaign 
6 years: Resumption 
1848 
Pennsylvania  --   Wiggin and Co  Barings leads heavy 
―attack‖ with other 
banks 
3 years: Resumption 
1845 
PARTIAL REPUDIATION 
Arkansas  --  --  Barings ignore, Huth 
makes efforts (g) 
No arrangement 
Louisiana   Baring   ―In London‖  Barings with help of 
Lizardi 
Restoration of credit 
(h) 
Michigan  --  --  Butler, New York 
Businessman 
8 years: Resumption 
1849 
TOTAL REPUDIATION 
Florida Territory   Thomas Wilson  --  Barings ignore, 
Palmer, McKillop & 
Dent makes effort (g) 
Repudiation, 1842 
Mississippi   Thomas Wilson   Thomas Wilson  Very weak Barings’ 
campaign with Huth (i) 
Repudiation, 1842 
(a)  English (1996). 
(b)  Fortune’s Epitome (1838). 
(c)  Fortune’s Epitome (1856). 
(d)  McGrane (1935), Hidy (1949). 
(e)  McGrane (1935), Hidy (1949), Kim and Wallis (2005). 
(f)  The Times (26 February 1851) states that Irving, Ebsworth, and Holmes are paying the coupon. 
(g)  ―[Barings] displayed no interest whatsoever in Florida and Arkansas‖ (Hidy 1949, p. 339). 
(h)  ―By 1848, credit of … reasonably well resuscitated‖ (Hidy 1949, p. 335). 
(i)  Mississippi: ―Restoration of good faith … always seemed so remote that B. never gave more than half-
hearted support‖ (Hidy 1949, p. 336). 
 